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Abstract 
 
With the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil well in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 
2010 and until the well was officially ‘killed’ on September 19, 2010, British Petroleum (BP) did 
not merely experience a crisis but a five-month marathon of sustained, multi-media engagement.  
Whereas traditional public relations theory teaches us that an organization should synchronize its 
messages across channels, there are no models to understand how an organization may 
strategically coordinate public relations messaging across traditional and social media platforms.  
This is especially important in the new media environment where social media (e.g., Facebook 
and Twitter) are increasingly being used in concert with traditional public relations tools (e.g., 
press releases) as a part of an organization’s stakeholder engagement strategy.  
The present study is a content analysis examining all of BP’s press releases (N = 126), its 
Facebook posts (N = 1,789), and its Twitter tweets (N = 2,730) during the 2010 Gulf crisis (May 
20, 2010 through September 20, 2010). Results demonstrate BP used a synchronized approach 
with press releases serving as the hub for their multi-media strategy. 
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For more than a century, public relations relied on the traditional press release to drive its 
message to the media and ultimately its stakeholders; however, within the last decade the 
fundamental nature of public relations has changed with the growth in the importance of social 
media (Waters et al., 2010, Winchell, 2010).  In fact, Smith (2010) argues that the power of 
communication has shifted from public relations practitioners to social media users.  The field is 
recognizing the strategic value of institutionalizing the use of social media as a routine part of 
stakeholder engagement because they can reach broader audiences (Eyrich et al., 2008), allowing 
organizations to engage in a dialogue with stakeholders that will shape and form their 
relationships with them (Sung-Un et al., 2010).  Taken together these changes necessitate a 
different model for analyzing and evaluating an organization’s public relations efforts; one that is 
inherently integrated considering both traditional public relations tools and social media (Diers, 
2012).  This need for message synchronization is even stronger in the context of crisis response 
because organizations are expected to provide up-to-date, specific, and accurate information 
about the crisis (Sung-Un et al., 2010, Veil and Ojeda, 2010). Yet, there is little research 
analyzing message synchronicity in routine contexts let alone during crises. Therefore, analyzing 
an organization’s multi-media response to a prolonged crisis would afford the best opportunity to 
initially identify a model for multi-media engagement.  
The Case of the 2010 BP Spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
On April 20, 2010 there was an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the 
Gulf of Mexico killing 11 workers.  Over the next five months, BP would have to manage its 
image in the face of an environmental catastrophe to a variety of multi-national stakeholders.  As 
details emerged, it became clear that it was not merely an accident but an organizational 
transgression (Coombs and Holladay, 2002); one in a line of deadly BP transgressions within the 
last decade including explosions in Texas and Alaska (Maresh and Williams, 2007).  The scope 
of the Gulf disaster meant that there was a significant focus on the situation and BP’s response to 
it.  In fact, from April 20 to July 28, 2010, the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in 
Journalism estimated that the oil spill received 22 percent of the US news coverage 
(Anonymous, 2010).  One of the dominant themes was BP’s poor public relations efforts, such as 
Tony Hayward’s series of gaffes. Glenn DaGian, a retired BP public relations professional, 
summarized the point, “…The only time Tony Hayward opens his mouth was to change feet.” 
(Besley, 2011).  
Steve Marino, who worked for Ogilvy & Mather at the time, said of BP’s social media 
strategy, “I think they did a great job, considering the pressure they were under on so many other 
fronts.” (Shogren, 2011).  Marino said BP used Facebook as a place for people to vent their 
frustrations and that Twitter allowed BP to get its news out quickly.  However, Marino’s 
trumpeting of BP’s online strategy was not universally shared.  Critics argued that the 
fundamental flaw in BP’s social media push was that it failed to engage its stakeholders 
(Geoghegan and Monseau, 2011).  In fact, Pew Research found that the spill story generated 
considerably less attention on blogs, Twitter, and YouTube, suggesting that BP’s message did 
not go viral; an indicator of a failed social media strategy (Metzgar and Maruggi, 2009).  
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Instead of rushing to judge BP’s 2010 crisis response as merely effective or ineffective as 
evidenced by the superficial assessments of “venting” and going “viral”, we should be asking 
more fundamental questions like, “What does an integrated multi-media approach to crisis 
response look like?” or “Is this an effective model for engagement?” This would offer more 
analytical value than snap judgments and compartmentalizing our analysis by channel, tactic, or 
time period.  Thus, this paper is important for two reasons.  First, it reflects the transformation in 
how today’s stakeholders engage with issues and organizations using traditional and social media 
(Stassen, 2010).  Second, as Massey (2001) argues, scientific research has failed to investigate 
the relationship between message consistency and crisis management. 
While ours is not the first analysis of the 2010 spill, previous research (Harlow et al., 
2011) focused only on BP’s immediate responses,1 analyzed press releases alone, and limited its 
analysis to the five tactics identified in Benoit’s Image Repair Theory (Benoit and Henson, 
2009). Though valuable as an analysis of BP’s early response to the crisis, it also fails to 
consider BP’s multi-media approach along with a fuller range of response strategies.  Given the 
duration of this crisis, it is an analytical opportunity that stands in contrast to most longitudinal 
studies that analyze image recovery after a crisis (Reierson et al., 2009, Seeger and Ulmer, 
2002).  Piotrowski and Guyette (2010) demonstrated the importance of such a study in their 
analysis of the evolution of the Toyota recall, identifying the crisis response role as one that 
significantly influenced the company’s prospects for image renewal post-crisis.  As such, the 
present study evaluates BP’s integrated crisis response strategy, building a more scientific tool 
for analyzing multi-media stakeholder engagement.  
Literature Review 
 There has been significant work in the field of crisis communication to build theory and 
analyze crisis response strategies (e.g., Image Restoration Theory and Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory).  Yet, present theory and its application to multi-media crisis response 
fails to build an effective model that predicts how organizations might integrate messages across 
different channels.  This section will examine crisis response and media synchronicity together in 
the context of crisis communication.  
Message Strategies 
 While a perfect list of strategies may not exist (Coombs, 2007), there is a strong body of 
research identifying more than 40 individual tactics encompassed by eight broad tactic categories 
(Diers and Tomaino, 2010), giving academics and practitioners a set of effective tactics on which 
to base analyses, identify strategies, and compare the emergence of those strategies across crises, 
industries and time (see Table 1). We argue that beginning analyses from the categories or ‘list’ 
of identified tactics is a much stronger way to approach an authentic analysis of crisis 
                                                          
1 Harlow, et. al’s (2010) study focused on press releases issued by BP between May 20, 2010 and June 15, 2010.  
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communication than confining our analysis to a particular theory if we are to build more 
effective models for crisis communication. 
 
Table 1 
Taxonomy of Crisis Response Tactics Potentially Used By Organizations 
Tactic Category Strategy Description Example Key Author(s) 
Self-Enhancement Emphasizes product/ company quality or provides 
information to make the organization look positive.  
Heath (1994), Proto & Supino 
(1999), Scott & Lane (2000) 
Routine 
Communication 
Communication emphasizing organizational goals/ 
mentioning mission/ vision; reporting assets, liabilities, and 
interest in cooperation to increase market value 
Fiol (1995), Heath (1994), 
Proto & Supino (1999) 
Framing the Crisis Development of dominant narrative, use of narrative to 
explain the problem; educating with the goal of increasing 
stakeholder empowerment; communicating the importance 
of the situation 
Bennett (1998), Kauffman 
(2001), Martinelli & Briggs 
(1998), Massey (2001), 
Mohamed, et al. (1999), 
Rowan (1996) , Sellnow 
(1993), Slovic (1987), 
Williams & Olaniran (1998) 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Sturges 
(1994) 
Framing the 
Organization 
Efforts to create positive image by reminding stakeholders of 
past good works or qualities, presenting the organization as 
being highly competent in the face of the crisis; portraying 
the organization in a light to set the tone for the outcome of 
the crisis 
Coombs & Schmidt (2000) 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997), 
Benoit (2004), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Kauffman 
(2001), Sellnow & Brand 
(2001),  
Anti-social or 
Defensive 
The organization cannot/ does not choose to act; using 
explanations that might ward off negative implications to the 
image; indicating actions are driven by compliance; non-
cooperation; de-emphasizing the role in blame or even 
shifting the blame; minimizing the situation 
Henriques & Sadorsky (1999) 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Benoit & 
Czerwinski (1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Henderson 
(2003), Ray (1999), Sellnow & 
Ulmer (1995) 
Accommodative Effort to ‘correct’ actions adversely affecting others. Can 
include announcements of recall or offers of compensation; 
Communication of contrition, admission of blame including 
remorse and requests for pardon, mortification; 
communicating concern for those affected; offering 
assurances 
Benoit (2004; 1997), 
Benoit & Czerwinski 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Coombs & Schmidt 
(2000), Henderson 
(2003), Martinelli & 
Briggs (1998), 
Mohamed, et al. 
(1999), Ray (1999) 
Excellence/ 
Renewal  
Emphasizing openness and willingness to engage about the 
issue; Portraying the organization as having integrity, social 
responsibility, moral worthiness; Engaging in actions to 
atone for transgression and persuade stakeholders of 
positive identity 
Das & Teng (1998), 
Milliman, et al. (1994), 
Nielson & Bartenuk (1996), 
Williams & Olaniran (1998) 
Interorganizational 
Relationships 
Identifying either a positive or negative link to another; 
minimizing traits or accomplishments of a negatively linked 
other or bolstering the traits of a positively linked other; 
emphasizing a desire to work with others 
Mohamed, et al. (1999),  
Sellnow & Brand (2001), 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997),  
Coombs & Schmidt (2000), 
Henriques & Sadorsky 
(1999), Martinelli & Briggs 
(1998), Milliman, et al. 
(1994) 
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We could expect BP to employ one or more of the following strategies by pairing this heuristic 
with previous findings regarding crisis-prone organizations experiencing organizational 
transgressions (Coombs, 2004, Diers and Tomaino, 2010, Diers, 2009). First, crisis-prone 
organizations tend to focus on future-oriented strategies incorporating tactics like self-
enhancement, excellence and renewal, or invoking inter-organizational relationships.  Second, 
organizations experiencing transgressions have focused on a variety of strategies such as 
aggressive strategies, which incorporate tactics like framing the crisis and anti-social or 
defensive; defensive strategies that use anti-social or defensive and accommodative tactics; and 
affirming amplification strategies that focus on positive messages about the organization 
incorporating three or more tactics.  In addition, organizations facing transgressions have used 
explanative strategies (i.e., efforts to create goodwill while explaining the crisis characterized by 
openness, engagement, and an appearance that the organization is sympathetic) and corrective 
strategies (i.e., those emphasizing accommodative, excellence, and often invoking inter-
organizational relationships).  The preponderance of research (Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 
Diers and Tomaino, 2010) suggests that organizations experiencing transgressions emphasize 
more pro-social or positive strategies rather than negative ones. 
Media Synchronicity  
 By establishing the likely messaging organizations facing a transgressions use, we can 
then turn our attention to how those strategies might be implemented across platforms.  Modern 
analyses of crisis communication ought to include social media channels because the impact of 
new media is undeniable (Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009, Moore, 2004).  New media represent 
an interactive (or two-way) platform for organizations to manage both crises and the surrounding 
issues (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011).  However, while a majority of organizations have turned 
to the Internet to communicate with stakeholders during a crisis (Perry et al., 2003), they often 
prefer more traditional (or one-way) models of crisis communication.  For example, press 
releases remain the central driving force for an organization’s messaging (Bennett et al., 2011, 
Wilson, 2011). Yet, if the press release is the primary vehicle delivering an organization’s 
narrative (Vorvoreanu, 2009), the question of how the narrative is delivered across different 
media platforms still remains.   
Media synchronicity involves the coordination of an organization’s messages across 
platforms to produce a consistent strategy when responding to a crisis (Dennis, et al., 2008; 
Holladay, 2007; Massey, 2001).  Synchronicity is important because it: establishes and builds 
credibility with audiences (Holladay, 2007; Massey, 2001); allows stakeholders to more 
effectively coordinate their behaviors (Dennis, et al., 2008); and ultimately helps organizations 
build (or rebuild) their legitimacy after a crisis (Massey, 2001).  These elements allow a 
company in crisis to be able to drive its own narrative.  If the narrative is consistent and credible, 
there is a greater likelihood that the messaging will be used as part of the media coverage of the 
situation (Veil and Ojeda, 2010), go viral (Metzgar and Maruggi, 2009), or create a community 
of engagement with stakeholders (Bennett, et al., 2011).  In any case, the company’s perspective 
is more meaningfully reflected in conversations because synchronized messages have strong 
central themes that can vary depending on the channel or audience (Greenberg and MacAulay, 
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2009, Healy and Griffin, 2004, Yang et al., 2012).  For example, in a study of the Whole Foods 
through online press room, blog, and microblogging accounts, Gilpin (2011) found these 
channels overlapped on core themes but addressed different aspects of the organization’s image.   
Together these findings suggest that we should expect to see differences in messaging 
depending on channel.  This underscores the need for more research focused on the role and 
purpose of message synchronicity across traditional and social media platforms, which is even 
more pronounced given our present reliance on assertions that social media are merely good 
places for stakeholders to vent (Shogren, 2011) and evaluations that going viral is the best 
measure of a successful social media effort (Metzgar and Maruggi, 2009).  Thus, by analyzing a 
case like BP’s, we hope to uncover a model for crisis response that focuses on engagement 
(Bennett et al., 2011, Geoghegan and Monseau, 2011).   
Based on the previous research, we pose the following hypotheses and research 
questions: 
Hypothesis 1: BP’s messaging during the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico will differ based on 
platform (i.e., press release, Facebook, and Twitter). 
Hypothesis 2: BP’s response messages to the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico will 
predominantly employ positive/pro-social messaging. 
Research Question 1: What message strategies did BP use across each of the platforms 
(i.e., press release, Facebook, and Twitter) during the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico?  
Research Question 2: If BP’s messaging during the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico differed 
based on platform (i.e., press release, Facebook, and Twitter), does a conceptual model of 
synchronized crisis communication emerge from those differences? 
Methods 
 In order to analyze BP’s response to the Gulf crisis, press releases, Facebook posts, and 
Twitter tweets were identified as the most viable sources of the overall BP strategy for several 
reasons.  First, while BP has extensive website coverage for the crisis and branch websites for 
each of the states affected by the crisis, the number of unique messages was very low (n = 26) 
because information was duplicated.  Second, BP launched an aggressive YouTube campaign in 
response to the Gulf (Shogren, 2011); however, these videos typically employed company 
leaders and as previous research suggests, the function and communicative messages from 
leaders during a crisis are substantially different from other public relations efforts during crises 
(Farmer and Tyedt, 2005, Griffin-Padgett and Allison, 2010, Hwang and Cameron, 2008, Lucero 
et al., 2009, Oliveira and Murphy, 2009, Pines, 2000, Sandler, 2009, Wesseling, 2008). 
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Additionally, because this research focuses on BP’s crisis responses, it was most appropriate to 
exclusively look at BP controlled messaging because the media typically select and frame the 
information (or direct quotations) that they use from organizations during crises to serve their 
commercial and/or political ends (Aalbert et al., 2010, An and Gower, 2009, Andsager and 
Smiley, 1998, Berger, 2009, Crider, 2010, July 10, Duhe and Zoch, 1994, Iyengar and Curran, 
2009).  Thus, all press releases (n = 126), Facebook posts (n = 1,789), and Twitter tweets (n = 
2,730) were collected and analyzed for this project. 
Coding Scheme 
 The unit of analysis was operationalized as a single message (i.e., a single press release, 
post, or tweet) because previous studies of crisis response messages (e.g., Benoit and 
Czerwinski, 1997; Elsbach, 1994; Greer and Moreland, 2003; Henderson, 2003, Kauffman, 
2001) emphasize that when studying crisis communication, examining the interplay of tactics 
within a message employed affords researchers more information about an organization’s 
strategy. 
 The coding scheme was based on manifest content for each variable with 
operationalization reflected in Table 1 for crisis messages. Thirty-three members of a graduate 
course in Organizational Communication coded portions of the data as a part of a class project. 
The coders were each assigned data from a single channel.  Each coder received a codebook and 
a 50-minute training session with coding examples and two follow-up virtual question and 
answer sessions on coding.  Once trained, the coders independently coded the data and followed 
procedures to establish intercoder reliability as used by Molleda, et al. (2005).  Ten percent of 
the sample was randomly selected and independently coded by the project leader finding the 
coding scheme to be reliable (= .83).  Coders noted whether each tactic was present or not.   
Analysis Methods 
 To test the hypotheses and answer the research questions three analytical techniques were 
used: ANOVA, Exploratory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation and Kaiser Normalization, 
and correlations.  To evaluate the hypotheses an ANOVA with Scheffe post hoc analysis 
analyzing the influence of channel on the presence of each message tactic was used.   
Because the ANOVA identified significant differences in the tactics used based on 
channel for all tactics (see Table 2), separate factor analyses were used to identify the strategies – 
that is the combination of tactics – BP used in response to the crisis for each platform (i.e., press 
releases, Facebook, and Twitter).  Wrench, Thomas-Maddox, Richmond, and McCroskey (2008) 
identify the primary functions of factor analysis indicating that it: (1) is a tool to establish 
construct validity that identifies mutually exclusive highly correlated concepts; (2) allows us to 
know if the correlations between concepts are meaningful; and that (3) exploratory factor 
analysis allows researchers to determine how many concepts the ‘scale’ is measuring.  Therefore, 
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while factor analyses are typically used to establish the relationship between survey questions, 
they are appropriate in identifying the unique message strategies emerging from a set of tactics 
because the goals in identifying strategies align with the goals of exploratory factor analyses.  
Thus, factors emerging with an Eigenvalue greater than 1 were included as primary strategies 
communicated by BP for each source.   
Table 2 
ANOVA Results for Source Influence on Response Tactics in the Gulf Crisis 
 
Response Tactics df F  p Post Hoc I Post 
Hoc J 
I-J Sig.  
Self Enhancement 2, 4625 117.74 .05 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R. 
P.R. 
.05 
-.39 
-.44 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Routine 
Communication 
2, 2625 6.41 .03 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.10 
.15 
.05 
.00 
.00 
.24 
Frame the Crisis 2, 4625 190.52 .08 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
-.27 
-.44 
.17 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Frame the 
Organization 
2.4625 535.16 .19 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.34 
-.35 
-.69 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Anti-Social or 
Defensive 
2, 4625 88.47 .04 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.00 
-.20 
-.19 
.18 
.00 
.00 
Accommodative 2, 4625 53.45 .02 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.09 
-.30 
-.39 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Excellence or 
Renewal 
2, 4625 675.02 .23 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.39 
-.09 
-.48 
.00 
.02 
.00 
Emphasizing 
Interorganizational 
Relationships 
2, 4625 354.02 .13 .00 Facebook 
 
Twitter 
Twitter 
P.R.  
P.R.  
.16 
-.39 
-.55 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Notes: P.R. represents Press Releases, the alpha for all tests was set at .05.  
 
Results 
  Taken together, these data largely confirm previous research and reveal important 
information about BP’s synchronization of messaging across platforms during the 2010 crisis in 
the Gulf of Mexico.  These data reveal that source significantly influenced BP’s use of tactics.  
Table 2 demonstrates that there are significant differences for all eight tactics based on the 
channel.  The post hoc analyses reveal significant differences for each comparison except two. 
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Where the Routine Communication tactics are used, Twitter and press releases do not 
significantly differ and where Anti-Social or Defensive are used, Facebook and Twitter do not 
significantly differ.  This offers general support confirming Hypothesis 1 that BP’s messaging 
during the Gulf crisis will significantly differ depending on platform.  Additionally, Hypothesis 2 
is strongly confirmed by simply examining the descriptive statistics for the ANOVA (see Table 
3).  By simply comparing BP’s use of defensive or anti-social tactics (n = 137) in different 
messages with the use of accommodative tactics (n = 1627) in different messages, the 
comparison is staggering.  Across five months of owned media messaging, negative messaging 
was only used five percent of the time compared to the most positive or pro-social tactics (i.e., 
accommodative) being used in approximately 60 percent of all of BP’s messaging.  
 
Table 3 
BP Response Tactics Descriptive Statistics 
Response Tactics Source Mean SD Count 
Self Enhancement Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.14 
1.09 
1.53 
1.12 
.35 
.29 
.50 
.33 
253 
251 
67 
571 
Routine 
Communication 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.18 
1.07 
1.02 
1.11 
.38 
.26 
.15 
.31 
314 
194 
3 
511 
Frame the Crisis Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.33 
1.60 
1.78 
1.51 
.47 
.48 
.42 
.50 
599 
1646 
98 
2343 
Frame the 
Organization 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.44 
1.10 
1.79 
1.25 
.50 
.30 
.41 
.43 
784 
272 
99 
1155 
Anti-Social or 
Defensive 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.02 
1.03 
1.22 
1.03 
.14 
.17 
.42 
.17 
33 
76 
28 
137 
Accommodative Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.40 
1.30 
1.69 
1.35 
.49 
.46 
.46 
.48 
707 
833 
87 
1627 
Excellence or 
Renewal 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.44 
1.05 
1.53 
1.21 
.50 
.22 
.50 
.41 
780 
137 
67 
984 
Emphasizing 
Interorganizational 
Relationships 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Press Release 
Total 
1.18 
1.02 
1.57 
1.10 
.39 
.16 
.50 
.30 
324 
67 
72 
463 
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BP’s Crisis Response Messaging  
Because of the significant differences previously discussed based on channel, strategies 
were identified for each of the three platforms separately.  Overall, these data further confirm 
Hypothesis 2 — that BP’s central response strategy to the Gulf crisis will employ positive 
messaging.  In answering Research Questions 1 and 2, asking what message strategies emerge 
across platforms (i.e., press releases, Facebook, and Twitter) and whether those reveal a 
conceptual model of synchronized crisis communication, these data reveal that while there are 
different strategies employed across the three platforms, the strategies used on Facebook and 
Twitter are derivatives of the central messaging used in press releases.   
 Press releases.  Three factors emerged from the factor analysis.  The most dominant 
strategy emerging was an affirming amplification strategy (Eigenvalue = 2.85) including self-
enhancement (.79), framing the organization (.79), accommodative (.74), and excellence or 
renewal (.76).  Additionally, two single-tactic strategies emerged including routine 
communication (Eigenvalue = 1.09) and defensive (Eigenvalue = 1.07).  Together, these factors 
account for 62.53 percent of the variance in the tactics for press releases.   
 Facebook.  Three factors also emerged from the factor analysis (n = 1,788).   The most 
dominant strategy emerging was an image-oriented Strategy (Eigenvalue = 1.63) including self-
enhancement (.61) and frame the organization (.67) tactics.  Additionally, two single-tactic 
strategies emerged with BP’s communication on Facebook: an accommodative strategy 
(Eigenvalue = 1.32) and an excellence strategy (Eigenvalue = 1.21).  In total, these factors 
account for 51.99 percent of the variance in the tactics on Facebook.   
 Twitter.  Four factors emerged for BP’s response to the Gulf of Mexico crisis using 
Twitter.  The most dominant factor was a corrective strategy (Eigenvalue 1.89) including efforts 
to frame the organization (.64), accommodative (.79), and excellence (.61) tactics.  Also 
emerging were three single-tactic strategies including self-Enhancement (Eigenvalue = 1.19), 
routine communication (Eigenvalue = 1.05), and defensive (Eigenvalue = 1.05).  In total, these 
factors account for 64.58 percent of the variance in the tactics.   
Discussion 
The BP crisis is an analytically and theoretically rich case that demonstrates how an 
organization may develop a synchronized approach to its crisis communication.  This section 
will therefore: (1) summarize these findings in terms of their implications to message 
synchronization across platforms; (2) identify the roles that different platforms may serve in a 
crisis, comparing these roles to previous analyses and assertions; and (3) finally propose a model 
for synchronized communication identifying areas for future research and model evaluation.  
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Message Synchronization 
 On the surface, the BP effort does not appear to be highly synchronized across its 
traditional and social media channels (see Table 2) because messaging significantly varied across 
the communication platforms.  However, a closer examination of the message strategies reveals 
those emerging in the press releases served as the strategic hub for BP’s response with the 
strategies emerging on Facebook and Twitter operating as the supporting spokes of the 
company’s communication network.  
The affirming amplification strategy was dominant in press releases incorporating self-
enhancement, framing the organization, accommodative, and excellence tactics.  This future-
oriented, positive, and pro-social strategy confirms previous research on organizational 
transgressions.  More importantly, components of this strategy were evident in the strategies for 
Facebook and Twitter.  Thus, while BP employed substantially different response strategies on 
Facebook and Twitter, the dominant messaging pushed in the press releases meaningfully 
connects the messaging across platforms.  Further, each of the additional strategies emerging in 
Facebook and Twitter are consistent with other strategies used in press releases throughout the 
crisis.  Taken together, these findings suggest BP’s message strategies were well-synchronized.  
Therefore, synchronization is not the same as message replication but should reflect the strengths 
and opportunities in each of the platforms.  
Roles of Different Platforms 
 Though these data were analyzed in the context of a crisis and are most generalizable to 
organizational transgressions, they generally support previous research analyzing the 
contemporary purpose that different communication platforms serve in public relations.  Because 
of the emergence and growth of social media, organizations are finding they need to diversify 
their channels of communication in order to reach an increasingly fragmented global mediascape 
(Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009, Piechota, 2011).  As such, there has been a fundamental shift 
in the ways organizations communicate with their constituencies from one-way methods of 
selective information dissemination to two-way engagement models generating more open 
conversation (Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009, Piechota, 2011).  Yet, crisis and general public 
relations theory fails to meaningfully predict relationships between message and channel – most 
focus either on describing responses (e.g., image repair theory) to crises or analyzing the 
situational variables that might influence crisis response (e.g., SCCT and contingency theory).  
This study is an analysis of BP’s actual response to the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and 
not its communicative intent.  Thus, our goal is to address present weaknesses in theory and 
practice by developing a framework that explains how and when different strategies may be used 
on various platforms, better reflecting the analytical and practical needs of public relations 
practice in the current media landscape.   
 Press releases.  Previous research suggests that press releases represent the driving force 
behind organizations’ public relations endeavors (Bennett, et al., 2011; Vorvoreanu, 2009; 
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Wilson, 2011).  Our BP findings confirm that during crises, the press release tells the story of the 
organization in crisis, supporting a more modern understanding of the roles and functions of 
press releases.   
Though press releases are most typically viewed in one of two ways – with a goal of 
getting media coverage (i.e., press agentry model) or disseminating information with the public 
relations practitioner acting as the ‘advocate journalist’ (i.e., the public information model) – 
both are inherently one-way models of communication (Seletzky and Lehman-Wilzig, 2010).  
One-way approaches to public relations simply do not reflect the modern purpose of the press 
release, which is to create a conversation with a broader range of stakeholders, not just 
traditional media (Majstrovic, 2009, Vorvoreanu, 2008).  In fact, in her analysis of the role of 
press releases in the Bosnia-Herzegovinian government, Majstrovic (2009) found that press 
releases were used as social relations documents communicating common goals, diversifying 
tools to communicate information, involving participatory mechanisms, and focusing on 
community-specific interests.  In the case of BP, the press releases were used to communicate 
future-oriented, positive, and pro-social messages sharing these same characteristics.  Thus, in 
the BP case, we find evidence that press releases reflect an emergent model where the ‘top 
down’ communication tools inform, focus, and shape an ongoing conversation (Greenberg and 
MacAulay, 2009).  
Facebook.  Where BP’s press releases created the narrative and opportunity for the 
emergence of a discursive community, BP’s messaging on Facebook supported the narrative by 
communicating the message that it cared about the Gulf Coast as evidenced by its emphasis on 
image-oriented or excellence and accommodative strategies.  These findings support previous 
research analyzing messaging on Facebook suggesting that organizations will use the platform to 
create, foster, and nurture image-oriented engagement efforts with stakeholders (Greenberg and 
MacAulay, 2009).   
In her analysis of political communication in Poland, Piechota (2011) found this type of 
messaging can be used over time to develop and promote communities of support for politicians 
because they focus on participation in on-going conversations.  If Facebook is a tool for 
organizations to reach out to different stakeholders (Waters et al., 2009), then it supports 
Majstrovic’s (2009) argument for a ‘social relations’ view of public relations because Facebook 
is a participatory platform.  Thus, organizations should think about Facebook as more than an 
outlet for unhappy stakeholders to vent during a crisis; instead, focusing on it as a venue for open 
conversation (Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009).  By focusing its messaging on image-oriented, 
excellence, and accommodative strategies, BP seems to have tried to foster a relationship both 
with those affected by the crisis and those interested in the Gulf coast. In this case, BP’s problem 
was that it was creating the relationship in the midst of the crisis rather than engaging an existing 
virtual community because while the company had a Facebook page before the well explosion, it 
had posted nearly nothing before this event.  During the crisis, they flooded their Facebook page 
with an average of almost 12 posts per day.  Relationally, it may be like closing the barn door 
after the horses have already stampeded. 
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Twitter.  Continuing a theme of too much too late for the 2010 crisis, BP created its 
Twitter account after the explosion in the Gulf and tweeted an average of 18 messages a day; 
messages largely focused on its work to correct the damage in the Gulf, promote its corporate 
identity, and defend criticisms of the corrective work it was doing. In this way, Twitter was used 
quite differently than Facebook, but still reflected the strong central narrative created by the 
press releases.  These findings support Piechota’s (2011) argument that diversifying messaging 
on different platforms is important because different channels speak to different groups.    
Additionally, these findings also demonstrate a different supporting role that Twitter can 
play.  While there are many creative uses of Twitter, such as publishing current events, 
fundraising, and thanking stakeholders (Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009), studies of Twitter’s 
use across nonprofit, corporate, and governmental organizations have found that it is typically 
used as a one-way tool to communicate information, to educate, to network, and to engage with 
content on other platforms (Greenberg and MacAulay, 2009, Rose, 2009, Waters and Williams, 
2011).  During BP’s crisis, it was used as BP’s workhorse communicating the vital and 
sometimes challenging messages the company had to disseminate broadly.  Because it was used 
as a one-way tool rather than a dialogic one, the defensive and routine messaging likely worked 
better because it did not invite conversation.  
Conceptual Model of Synchronized Communication 
 The reality of public relations has shifted.  Relational models have in many cases, 
superseded models emphasizing ‘command and control’ message dissemination.  This suggests 
that crisis communication cannot be divorced from dialogue.  The changing reality likely 
explains that while studied in a crisis context, these findings are parsimonious with previous 
research suggesting that regardless of situation, there is a predictable relationship between 
messaging and platform.  These findings also suggest that well-coordinated and consistent 
messaging on different platforms need not overlap, but all demonstrate relationship management, 
common themes, and model the reality the organization wants to present (Majstrovic, 2009).  
Therefore, we believe that these findings allow us to propose a model of synchronized 
communication – applicable to both crisis and routine contexts.  
 The model is based on a simple conceptualization of a network with press releases 
serving as the hub at the center with stakeholders connected to the organization via one or more 
platforms of communication (see Figure 1).  The more channels stakeholders and organizations 
use to communicate with one another, the more powerful the conversation and the stronger the 
opportunity for both to influence the other.  This conceptualization is based on findings that 
relationships are stronger when there are more structural attachments connecting organizations 
and people (Pauleen and Yoong, 2001, Seabright et al., 1992).  Very simply, an organization’s 
ability to advance its material and relational goals with its stakeholders (i.e., its movement) is 
likely advanced, halted, or reversed based on the strategy articulated in its press releases.  
However, the organization’s stakeholders may receive the messages through one or more of the 
channels the organization uses to communicate its central strategy – the spokes holding the hub 
and tire together.  The present study analyzed three channels (i.e., press releases, Facebook, and 
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Twitter); however, there are many more traditional and social media channels through which the 
stakeholders may receive the organization’s message.  The model supports the emergent 
communicative environment because it recognizes the importance of the role of press releases to 
communicate the organization’s narrative about issues, events, and even crises.  Further, the 
model helps to explain that in a fragmented global mediascape, social media can reinforce the 
company’s storyline or narrative while focusing on subplots relevant to different stakeholder 
groups.   
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 Applying the findings of the present study and previous research to this model, we can 
make predictions about the messaging and strategic use of different communicative platforms. 
First, we would still expect that organizations would develop narratives to address different 
situations, such as the narrative we identified with the BP study. However, once the story is told 
through the press release, it would be consistently communicated across different platforms.  
One of the assumptions that must be tested is the timing of the messaging – for the press release 
to drive the narrative, the talking points in the press release should precede their emergence on 
other channels. Additionally, message consistency among platforms should be tested in both 
crisis and routine contexts in order to determine the veracity of these findings.   
 Second, we argue that each platform plays symbiotic yet somewhat distinctive roles in 
creating and managing relationships between organizations and their stakeholders.  Greenberg 
and MacAulay (2009) argue that in the new media environment that traditional and social media 
channels work together to build networks of collaborators, increase information, foster creativity, 
and increase two-way symmetrical communication.  However, each platform represents one 
route to that same end.  Our findings suggest predictable functions each platform serves.  We 
have already identified the press release as hub of the narrative.  Together our findings, along 
with previous research on the role of Facebook, suggests it is used to develop and promote a 
discursive community driven by image-oriented pro-social messaging from the organization to 
its stakeholders.  Finally, our findings combined with previous research on Twitter suggests that 
instead of expecting to find meaningful two-way interactions, it is a platform for communicating 
more difficult messages – from the routine to the defensive.   
Though grounded by other research drawing together analyses from across sectors and 
countries, these conclusions are still primarily based in the findings of a longitudinal case study; 
therefore, cross-sectional analyses should be conducted to determine the predictive validity of 
the roles for Facebook and Twitter as part of an overall synchronized communication strategy.  
Further, because this model assumes that the more connections between stakeholders and 
organizations strengthens the power and influence each may exert, future research should also 
investigate the role of other platforms of both social and traditional media including, for 
example, advertising, news media, and other visual mediums (e.g., YouTube).   
Finally, as an inherent part of the model’s development and testing, future research 
should evaluate the effectiveness of predicted messaging across platforms because, as Greenberg 
and MacAulay (2009) suggest, managing ongoing relationships across different media is 
challenging, time consuming, and fluid.  Therefore, the model must be able to measure relational 
quality between organizations and their stakeholders.  The central question left unanswered in 
the present research is whether BP’s strategy met stakeholder needs.  Ultimately, the question 
really is, was BP’s strategy effective?    
 The present study highlights the influence of the choice of message and use of platform 
on the changing nature of public relations, particularly during a major crisis.  BP demonstrated 
that it performed as expected – both in terms of its message content and synchronization across 
communication platforms.  While we believe this model applies across different contexts, it 
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needs testing and substantial development in order for it to reliably predict relationships between 
messaging and communication platforms.  We also argue that in a modern view of public 
relations, stakeholder engagement must be evaluated as well.  Though this study offers a strong 
foundation for the message and platform evaluations, it does not offer a mechanism for 
evaluating stakeholder engagement.  Therefore, it is unlikely that most judgments about BP’s 
success or failure have considered all three components – a clear driving narrative, platform-
appropriate messaging, and stakeholder-appropriate messaging – needed to render a reasoned 
judgment about BP’s effectiveness in responding to the crisis in the Gulf of Mexico.  
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